Abstract. A (k, n; w) multi-receiver multi-message authentication code allows a transmitter to broadcast up to w−1 distinct authenticated messages to n receivers in such a way that (1) not only an opponent but also any up to k − 1 receivers cannot cheat any other receivers, and (2) all the receivers can independently verify the authenticity of the messages. Obana and Kurosawa [Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 22 (2001), pp. 47-63] used a special pair of orthogonal arrays, called TWOOA, to construct a (k, n; 2) multi-receiver single-message authentication code. In this paper, we generalize the notion of a TWOOA, and then use this generalized TWOOA to construct a (k, n; w) multireceiver multi-message authentication code, which exceeds that of Safavi-Naini and Wang [Proc. of Eurocrypt'98, LNCS 1403, Springer (1998 at least in the numbers of receivers and authenticated messages. The structures of TWOOAs are investigated. Two constructions for TWOOAs are also provided.
Introduction
The notion of an authentication code (A-code) was invented by Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloane [3] in 1974, and the game-theoretic model of an A-code was developed by Simmons [12] in 1984. A conventional A-code involves three active parties: a transmitter T , a receiver R, and an opponent O. The transmitter T transmits messages to the receiver R using a public communication channel. The opponent O has access to this channel and can interfere with the contents of cryptograms transmitted via this channel. In Simmons' model, the transmitter T and the receiver R share a common encoding rule (or key) e belonging to some key space E, and are both assumed honest. Given a source state (or plaintext) s from some source state space S, the transmitter T computes an authenticated message m = f (e, s) ∈ M , where f is an authentication function and M is the message space, and then sends m ∈ M to the receiver R. The receiver R can verify its authenticity using his/her knowledge of the key e ∈ E shared with the transmitter T .
An A-code C can be represented by a quadruple (S, M, E, f ) where S is a source state space, M is a message space, E is a key space, and f is a mapping from E × S to M such that f (e, s) = m and f (e, s ) = m imply s = s . In a systematic Cartesian A-code, the authenticated message m ∈ M corresponding to a source state s ∈ S using e ∈ E is the concatenation m = (s, a) of the source state s ∈ S and its authenticator a ∈ A, that is, M = S × A, where A is the authenticator space. The receiver R will detect a fraudulent message (s, a) ∈ M if the authenticator that he/she calculates for s ∈ S using his/her key e ∈ E shared with the transmitter T is different from the received authenticator a ∈ A. We will mainly investigate systematic Cartesian A-codes in this paper.
The notion of a conventional A-code can be easily generalized (see, for example, [13] ) to the case where the key e ∈ E can be used to authenticate up to w−1 consecutive distinct source states, where w ≥ 2 is some fixed integer. That is, for u, 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, consecutive distinct source states s 1 , . . . , s u ∈ S, the transmitter T computes their corresponding messages m 1 , . . . , m u ∈ M , where m j = f (e, s j ), 1 ≤ j ≤ u, and then sends m 1 , . . . , m u to the receiver R through a public communication channel. We use (S ≤w−1 , M ≤w−1 , E, f ) to denote such a multi-message A-code, where N ≤n denotes the set of all l-tuples of N with 0 ≤ l ≤ n.
The notion of a multi-receiver A-code was introduced by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung [2] as another generalization of that of a conventional A-code. In a (k, n) multireceiver A-code, there are n + 2 parties altogether: a transmitter T , n receivers R 1 , . . . , R n , and an opponent O. The transmitter T has a key e T ∈ E T and each receiver R i has a key e i ∈ E i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For a source state s ∈ S, the transmitter T computes a message m = f (e T , s) ∈ M , and then sends m ∈ M to receivers through a public communication channel. Each receiver R i accepts or rejects m by verifying m according to e i ∈ E i . It is assumed that at most k − 1 receivers are malicious who can collude with the opponent O to cheat other receivers.
We should note that in Desmedt, Frankel and Yung's model of a multi-receiver Acode, security analysis is only for a single message transmission, and for a second message no protection is guaranteed. To provide protection for multi-message transmission, we need the following more generalized definition of a (k, n; w) multi-receiver multi-message A-code, which is in fact synthesized from those in [2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13] . Such a generalized A-code has numerous applications and advantages. Readers are referred to [11, Section 1, Subsection 5.1] for some examples.
For simplicity we also use X to denote a random variable defined on a set X. The entropy H(X) of a random variable X with probability distribution P r(X = x) is defined as
As well, the conditional entropy H(X |Y ) is defined as
. . , f n ) if the following two conditions are satisfied.
(C1) There exist two mappings τ :
are surjective. We also assume that for each C i the probability distribution on the source states of C i is the same as that in C T , and the probability distribution on E i is derived from that of E T and the mapping τ i . Each receiver R i accepts or rejects m j by verifying m j individually according to e i ∈ E i . We also adopt Kerckhoff's principle that everything in the A-code except the actual keys of the transmitter and receivers is public. Malicious receivers can collude with the opponent O to cheat other receivers, after observing u, 0 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, transmitted distinct messages authenticated using the same key e T , by inserting a new message of their own choosing, hoping to have it accepted by other receivers as authentic, which was termed spoofing of order u by Massey in [8] . Condition (C2) means that any k random variables E i 1 , . . . , E i k are independent which can determine E T completely. This implies that there can be at most k − 1 malicious receivers in the generalized model. For any k-tuple of receivers (R i 1 , . . . , R i k ) having keys (e i 1 , . . . , e i k ) and for any source state s, there exists one and only one authenticated message (s, a) which is valid under each e ij for j = 1, . . . , k.
The deception probability P d u , 0 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, is the probability that the malicious receivers and the opponent O will succeed in deceiving other receivers with an order u spoofing attack. An order 0 spoofing attack is usually called an impersonation attack, and an order 1 spoofing attack is usually called a substitution attack. We define P d u of such a (k, n; w) multi-receiver multi-message A-code in the following way.
Let 0 ≤ j ≤ n. For any j-tuple R = (R i 1 , . . . , R ij ) of receivers, let e(R) = {(e i 1 , . . . , e ij )| e i 1 ∈ E i 1 , . . . , e ij ∈ E ij } denote the set of possible keys of R. Let C Ri = {R | R ⊆ {R 1 , . . . , R n } \ {R i }, 0 ≤ |R| ≤ k − 1} denote the family of at most k − 1 receivers who may try to cheat receiver R i . If R = ∅, we consider that an opponent O tries to cheat receiver R i . Suppose that after observing u, 0 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, transmitted consecutive distinct messages (m 1 , . . . , m u ) which are authenticated using the same key e T ∈ E T , R ∈ C Ri try to cheat receiver R i by inserting a new message m u+1 generated by their keys (e i 1 , . . . , e ij ) ∈ E i 1 × · · · × E ij . Their best strategy is to send m u+1 such that P r(R i accepts m u+1 | R i accepts (m 1 , . . . , m u )) is the maximum possible, for 0 ≤ u ≤ w − 1.
More precisely, for 0 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, the order u spoofing attack probability P d u of a (k, n; w) multi-receiver multi-message A-code in which the key e T ∈ E T is used to authenticate up to w − 1 consecutive distinct source states is defined as follows:
where m u+1 is generated by (e i 1 , . . . , e ij ) ∈ e(R), and the source states of m u+1 and m 1 , . . . , m u are all distinct.
In fact, when we compute the deception probabilities P d u , we need only to consider the coalition of tuples of up to a maximum size of receivers, that is, tuples of k − 1 malicious receivers, since they are at least as powerful as any other collusion.
In this paper, we use a combinatorial structure called TWOOA to construct unconditionally secure multi-receiver multi-message A-codes, that is, for any 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, the probability that the malicious receivers and the opponent will succeed in deceiving other receivers with an order u spoofing attack is the same as that with a random guessing. A TWOOA is a pair of orthogonal arrays satisfying a certain condition described in Section 3. The notion of a TWOOA with the strength of the second orthogonal array being 2 was introduced by Kurosawa and Obana [5, 9] , and was used to construct an unconditionally secure multi-receiver single-message A-code. In this paper, we first review Safavi-Naini and Wang's polynomial construction [10, 11] for multi-receiver multi-message A-codes, then we generalize the notion of a TWOOA to the case that the strength of the second orthogonal array can be any integer w ≥ 2, and then use these generalized TWOOAs to construct multi-receiver multi-message A-codes. The upper bounds on the numbers of columns in a TWOOA are determined. A direct construction and a product construction for TWOOAs are also presented. These constructions give infinite classes of TWOOAs meeting the upper bounds. As an immediate consequence, our multi-receiver multi-message A-codes are better than Safavi-Naini and Wang's in terms of the numbers of receivers and source states.
DFY polynomial scheme and its extension
In this section, we briefly review the well-known DFY polynomial scheme due to Desmedt, Frankel and Yung [2] , and describe its extension to multi-message model due to Safavi-Naini and Wang [10, 11] .
In 1992, Desmedt, Frankel and Yung [2] proposed a (k, n; 2) multi-receiver singlemessage A-code (called DFY polynomial scheme) as follows. Assume that there are a transmitter T , n receivers R 1 , . . . , R n , and an opponent O. Let q ≥ n be a prime number, and let [2] that in this scheme, the impersonation attack probability P d 0 and the substitution attack probability P d 1 are both equal to 1/q, which means that the above DFY polynomial scheme is an unconditionally secure (k, n; 2) multi-receiver single-message A-code.
Six years later, Safavi-Naini and Wang [10, 11] extended the above DFY polynomial scheme to multi-message model in which each key of T can be used to authenticate consecutive distinct source states. In their extended scheme, the key for T consists of w random polynomials P 1 (x), . . . , P w (x) ∈ P k−1 [x] , and the key for each R i consists of
w , where
. It is proved [10] that this extended scheme is a (k, n; w) multi-receiver multi-message A-code in which every key of T can be used to authenticate up to w − 1 consecutive distinct source states. It is also proved [10] that for 0 ≤ i ≤ w − 1, the order i spoofing attack probability P d i is equal to 1/q, which means that Safavi-Naini and Wang's extended DFY polynomial scheme is an unconditionally secure (k, n; w) multi-receiver multi-message A-code.
We would like to emphasize that in Safavi-Naini and Wang's extended DFY polynomial scheme, the numbers of possible receivers and source states are both not greater than q.
TWOOA: definition and elementary properties
In this section, we introduce the notion of a TWOOA and show some of its elementary properties.
We first recall that an orthogonal array OA λ (k, l, n), with strength k, is a λl k × n array of l symbols such that, in any k columns of the array, every one of the possible l k k-tuples of symbols occurs in exactly λ rows of the array. If λ = 1, usually this array is briefly denoted by OA(k, l, n).
Let L 1 = (a ij ) be an OA(k, t w , n). Let 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, and C = (c ij ) be a t wk × u array of t k symbols. Let Q be the set of row vectors of C. For α ∈ Q, suppose that
Define B(α) to be the h × n sub-array of L 1 which consists of the i j -th row of L 1 for j = 1, . . . , h. We say that L 1 and C are friendly if every column of B(α) contains
The notion of a TWOOA with w = 2 was first introduced by Kurosawa and Obana [5, 9] to characterize and construct a (k, n; 2) multi-receiver single-message A-code in which the key e T of T is used to authenticate a single source state. In this paper, we try to use the generalized TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m) to construct a (k, n; w) multireceiver multi-message A-code in which the key e T can be used to authenticate up to w − 1 consecutive distinct source states.
We first show that Safavi-Naini and Wang's extended DFY polynomial scheme forms in fact a TWOOA.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a TWOOA(k, q w , n; w, q k , q) for any prime q and any two positive integers n, w satisfying max{n, w} ≤ q, where k ≤ n.
Proof. Let q ≥ max{n, w} be a prime number, and
where the l-th column is labeled by the element x l ∈ GF (q).
, and L 2 as follows:
where the (s + 1)-th column is labeled by the element s ∈ GF (q). The rows of L 1 and L 2 are both labeled by (P i1 (x), . . . , P iw (x)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q wk . By the Lagrange interpolation formula for polynomials, we immediately know that L 1 is an orthogonal array OA(k, q w , n). Since the coefficient matrix
is a Vandermonde matrix, we also know that L 2 is an orthogonal array OA(w, q k , q). Now we prove that for any u, 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, L 1 and any q wk × u sub-array of L 2 are friendly. Choose any u columns of L 2 , say, the s 1 -th, . . . , s u -th columns, and then fix arbitrarily one of their row u-vectors, say (Q 1 (x), . . . , Q u (x)). Then again from the coefficient matrix 
we can determine exactly u polynomials in the w-tuples (P i1 (x), . . . , P iw (x)) such that
This completes the proof.
2
We remark that the case w = 2 in Theorem 3.1 was first proved in [9] . The following are some elementary properties of TWOOAs which are indispensable to our later discussions.
Then there are exactly t r(w−u) distinct r-tuples (a ij 1 , . . . , a ijr ) ∈ U r in any C(j 1 , . . . , j r ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) of a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m), where every r-tuple occurs exactly t (k−r)(w−u) times.
Proof. It is easy to see that
First we consider the case 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1. In this case, since L is a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m), every C(j v ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) has exactly t w−u distinct symbols for any 1 ≤ v ≤ r, which implies that any C(j 1 , . . . , j r ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) has at most t r(w−u) distinct r-tuples of U r . Therefore we need only to prove that every r-tuple in C(j 1 , . . . , j r ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) occurs exactly t (k−r)(w−u) times. If it is not the case, then there must exist at least one r-tuple α = (a 1 , . . . , a r ) ∈ C(j 1 , . . . , j r ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) such that α occurs f times, where f > t (k−r)(w−u) . If r = k, then this means that there exists a k-tuple α of U k which occurs more than once, a contradiction to the fact that L 1 is an OA λ (k, t w , n) with λ = 1. If 1 ≤ r ≤ k − 1, then for any other k − r columns j 1 , . . . , j k−r of L 1 , in a similar fashion, we can also show that C(j 1 , . . . , j k−r ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) has at most t (k−r)(w−u) (which is less than f ) distinct (k − r)-tuples of U k−r . This implies that C(j 1 , . . . , j r , j 1 , . . . , j k−r ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) has repeated k-tuples, again a contradiction to the fact that L 1 is an OA λ (k, t w , n) with λ = 1. The case f < t (k−r)(w−u) can be analyzed in a similar way. So we know that the assertion holds for 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1. Next we consider the case u = w. In this case, |R(h 1 , . . . , h w ; b 1 , . . . , b w )| = 1 for any w columns h 1 , . . . , h w of L 2 and for any w-tuple (b 1 , . . . , b w ) ∈ V w . So there is only one r-tuple in any C(j 1 , . . . , j r ; h 1 , . . . , h w ; b 1 , . . . , b w ) of a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m) which occurs only once. This completes the proof. For any r, 1 ≤ r ≤ k − 1, columns j 1 , . . . , j r of L 1 and for any r-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a r ) ∈ U r , define
It is easy to see that |R (j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r )| = t w(k−r) since L 1 is an OA(k, t w , n). For any column h of L 2 , we further define B(j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r ; h) to be the collection of b ih ∈ V for all i ∈ R (j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r ). We have the following result.
Lemma 3.3. B(j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r ; h) contains exactly t k−r distinct symbols.
Proof. Since |R (j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r )| = t w(k−r) , we need only to prove that every distinct symbol in B(j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r ; h) occurs exactly t (w−1)(k−r) times. If it is not the case, then there must exist at least one b ∈ B(j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r ; h) such that b occurs f = t (w−1)(k−r) times. Then the r-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a r ) ∈ U r will occur exactly f = t (k−r)(w−1) times in C(j 1 , . . . , j r ; h; b), a contradiction to Lemma 3.2. This completes the proof. This immediately implies the following result, which means that the friendship is a symmetric property.
Proof. The assertion comes from the definition of a TWOOA and Lemma 3.3. 
A construction for A-codes from TWOOAs
Now we describe how to use a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m) to construct a (k, n; w) multi-receiver multi-message A-code. Theorem 4.1. If there exists a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m), then there exists an unconditionally secure systematic Cartesian (k, n; w) multi-receiver multi-message A-code
where each key of the transmitter T is used with equal probability to authenticate up to w − 1 consecutive distinct source states, and the order u spoofing attack probability
w , n; w, t k , m) where L 1 is an OA(k, t w , n) based on a t w -set U and L 2 is an OA(w, t k , m) based on a t k -set V . Let e T , 1 ≤ e T ≤ t wk , be the indices of row vectors of L (and thus of both L 1 and L 2 ). Let j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, be the indices of the columns of L 1 , and s ∈ S be the indices of the columns of L 2 . For a source state s ∈ S, the transmitter T computes f T (e T , s) = (s, a) ∈ M such that the authenticator a ∈ A is the (e T , s)-th element of L 2 , and then broadcasts the authenticated message m = (s, a) ∈ M to the receivers. The corresponding decoding rule e j ∈ E j of receiver R j is the (e T , j)-th element of L 1 . Receiver R j accepts m = (s, a) as authentic if and only if there exists e T ∈ E T such that (1) the (e T , s)-th element of L 2 is a ∈ A, and (2) the (e T , j)-th element of L 1 is e j ∈ E j . The mappings f 1 , . . . , f n can be defined in an obvious way.
Suppose that each key e T ∈ E T of the transmitter T is used with equal probability. Then for any 1 ≤ r ≤ k and for any 1 ≤ j 1 , . . . , j r ≤ n, any r-tuple of possible keys (e j 1 , . . . , e jr ) ∈ E j 1 × · · · × E jr will also occur with equal probability over U r . From the definition of the deception probability, for any receiver R i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we need only to consider the cases R ∈ C Ri with |R| = k − 1, since the coalition of tuples of k − 1 malicious receivers are at least as powerful as any other collusion. Let E i ((s 1 , a 1 a 1 ) , . . . , f T (e T , s u ) = (s u , a u )}. By Lemma 3.2, we know that |E i ((s 1 , a 1 ) , . . . , (s u , a u ))| = t w−u . Then the deception probabilities in this case can be computed in the following way:
and for each u = 1, 2, . . . , w − 1, a 1 ) ,...,(s u+1 ,a u+1 ) | s u+1 =s l , l=1,...,u} |E i ((s 1 , a 1 
Now for any k − 1 columns j 1 , . . . , j k−1 of L 1 , for any e j 1 ∈ E j 1 , . . . , e j k−1 ∈ E j k−1 , and for any u, 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, columns s 1 , . . . s u of L 2 = (a e T ,s ), we define C (j 1 , . . . , j k−1 ; e j 1 , . . . , e j k−1 ; s 1 , . . . , s u ) to be the collection of u-tuples (a e T ,s 1 , . . . , a e T ,su ) ∈ V u for all e T ∈ F (e j 1 , . . . , e j k−1 ), where F (e j 1 , . . . , Meanwhile, for any k columns j 1 , . . . , j k of L 1 , and for any e j 1 ∈ E j 1 , . . . , e j k ∈ E j k , since L 1 is an OA(k, t w , n), we can determine the unique key e T ∈ E T corresponding to e j 1 ∈ E j 1 , . . . , e j k ∈ E j k . But for any k − 1 columns j 1 , . . . , j k−1 of L 1 , and for any e j 1 ∈ E j 1 , . . . , e j k−1 ∈ E j k−1 , again by the fact that L 1 is an OA(k, t w , n), we know that for any one of the t w possible keys e i ∈ E i , the k-tuple (e j 1 , . . . , e j k−1 , e i ) ∈ E j 1 × · · · × E j k−1 × E i appears exactly once in columns j 1 , . . . , j k−1 and i of L 1 , which means that any group of at most k − 1 malicious receivers cannot determine the key e i ∈ E i held by receiver R i .
On the other hand, each key e T ∈ E T is not allowed to authenticate more than or equal to w consecutive distinct source states, otherwise this key e T would be determined uniquely by anyone who has observed the corresponding authenticated messages for the reason that L 2 is an OA(w, t k , m), and then he/she would succeed in deceiving others by knowing the key e T ∈ E T of the transmitter.
The proof is then completed.
Upper bounds on TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m)
In this section, we further investigate the structure of a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m), and then derive some upper bounds on the column numbers n and m.
As in Section 3, we again let L = L 1 • L 2 be a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m), where
Proof. For any r, 1 ≤ r ≤ k, columns j 1 , . . . , j r of L 1 , applying Lemma 3.2, we can see that there are exactly t r(w−u) distinct r-tuples in C(j 1 , . . . , j r ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) each of which occurs exactly t (k−r)(w−u) times. Taking r = 1, we immediately know that every column of C(j 1 , . . . , j r ; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) contains exactly t w−u distinct symbols of U each of which occurs exactly t (k−1)(w−u) times. Since the properties of an orthogonal array are invariant under any permutation of the elements, without loss of generality, we may assume that these symbols belong to the same t w−u -subset of U . Since L 1 is an OA(k, t w , n), this forces C (1, 2, . . . , n; h 1 , . . . , h u ; b 1 , . . . , b u ) to be an OA(k, t w−u , n). Similarly, for any r columns j 1 , . . . , j r of L 1 and for any r-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a r ) ∈ U r , as in Section 3, we again let R (j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r ) = {i | (a ij 1 , . . . , a ijr ) = (a 1 , . . . , a r ),
u for all i ∈ R (j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r ). Then by Corollary 3.4, we can also have the following result.
Lemma 5.2. C (j 1 , . . . , j r ; a 1 , . . . , a r ; 1, 2, . . . , m) is an OA(w, t k−r , m).
The following bound on the column number of an orthogonal array can be found in [1, p. 180, Theorem 5.12].
Lemma 5.3 (Bush bound). For
To construct TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m) directly, the notion of an (n, i, q)-set will be used. Let q be a prime power and V i (GF (q)) be the i-dimensional vector space over GF (q). A set of n vectors in V i (GF (q)) is called an (n, i, q)-set if any i of them are linearly independent. For any pair (i, q), the largest integer n such that an (n, i, q)-set exists is denoted by m(i, q).
Lemma 6.1 ( [7, 4] ). The value of m(i, q) is determined in the following cases:
(1) m(2, q) = q + 1; (2) m(3, q) = q + 1 for q odd, and m(3, q) = q + 2 for q even; (3) m(i, q) = i + 1 for i ≥ q.
Lemma 6.2 ([14]).
If q > 4 is a prime power, then there exists a (q + 1, i, q)-set for any i, 3 < i < q.
We use a q wk -set S to index the rows of a TWOOA(k, q w , n; w, q k , m), where
For the first OA of this TWOOA, we use an (m(k, q), k, q)-set to index its columns where n = m(k, q). Similarly, for the second OA of this TWOOA, we use an (m(w, q), w, q)-set to index its columns where m = m(w, q). Let R 1 be an (m(k, q), k, q)-set in a row vector space, and R 2 an (m(w, q), w, q)-set in a column vector space. Define two arrays L 1 = (a M r ) and L 2 = (b M c ) as follows:
the entry of (M, r) is rM, a row vector of length w,
the entry of (M, c) is M c, a column vector of length k,
Proof. We need only to prove that for any given k row vectors r ji = (x ji1 , . . . , x jik ) ∈ R 1 , 1 ≤ j i ≤ m(k, q), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and for any given ((e 11 , e 12 , . . . , e 1w ), (e 21 , e 22 , . . . , e 2w ), . . . , (e k1 , e k2 , . . . , e kw )) ∈ (GF (q) × · · · × GF (q)) k , there exists exactly one M ∈ S such that r j 1 M = (e 11 , e 12 , . . . , e 1w ), r j 2 M = (e 21 , e 22 , . . . , e 2w ), (6.1) . . .
, e k2 , . . . , e kw ). Then the system of equations (6.1) is equivalent to the following matrix equation:
Since the row vectors r j 1 , . . . , r j k are taken from an (m(k, q), k, q)-set R 1 , they are linearly independent, which means that X −1 exists. Thus, M = X −1 Y is uniquely determined. This completes the proof. Similarly, we can prove the following result.
Now we show that L 1 = (a M r ) is in fact friendly with any u, 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, columns of L 2 = (b M c ). For convenience, for any given c i = (y 1i , y 2i , . . . , y wi ) T ∈ R 2 and for any given
Proof. For any given u with 1 ≤ u ≤ w − 1, for any given c i = (y 1i , y 2i , . . . , y wi ) T ∈ R 2 , for any given v i = (f 1i , f 2i , . . . , f ki )
T ∈ GF (q) k , 1 ≤ i ≤ u, and for any given r = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ R 1 , let D be the collection of elements a M r where M ∈ R(c 1 , . . . , c u ; v 1 , . . . , v u ). Since |R(c 1 , . . . , c u ; v 1 , . . . , v u )| = q k(w−u) , from the definition of friendship, we need only to prove that every element in D occurs exactly q (k−1)(w−u) times.
For any v 0 = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e w ) ∈ D, define
As we just said, we need only to prove that
From D v 0 , we have rM = v 0 and M c i = v i for 1 ≤ i ≤ u, which are equivalent to the following system of equations in unknowns a 11 , . . ., a k1 , a 12 , . . ., a k2 , . . ., a 1w , . . . , a kw : Then the system of equations (6.3) can be re-written as follows:
Since r = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ R 1 cannot be an all-zero vector, without loss of generality, we may assume that x 1 = 0. Then the row vectors (y 1i , . . . , y wi ), 1 ≤ i ≤ u, of the sub-array consisting of the first w columns of G can be canceled by elementary transformations of rows. The resultant matrix
can be transformed again into
and further into If y j = 0 for some w + (k − 1)u + 1 ≤ j ≤ w + ku, then (6.5) has no solution, which forces (6.4) to have no solution, a contradiction. Since x 1 = 0, and the u vectors c i , 1 ≤ i ≤ u, are taken from an (m(w, q), w, q)-set R 2 so that they are linearly independent, we know that rank(G ) = w+(k−1)u. Hence (6.5) has q wk−(w+(k−1)u) = q (k−1)(w−u) solutions. This completes the proof. From Lemma 6.2, we have the following result.
Corollary 6.7. If q > 4 is a prime power, then there exists a TWOOA(k, q w , q + 1; w, q k , q + 1) for any 3 < k, w < q.
Comparing m(k, q) with B(k, q), we see that they are equal when k = 2, 3, or k ≥ q for any prime power q. In other words, the upper bounds can be met in these cases. Besides the three infinite classes of TWOOAs in [14, Corollary 3.8] corresponding to w = 2, we also have the following new ones.
Proof. Take arbitrarily fixed u, 1 ≤ u ≤ w−1, columns b h 1 , . . . , b hu of L 2 . Let Q be the collection of row vectors of the (ts)
wk ×u sub-array of L 2 which is consisted of these u columns. For any arbitrarily fixed (β 1 , . . . , β u ) ∈ Q, define E = {e | (l 
ehu ) = (β 1 , . . . , β u ), 0 ≤ e ≤ (ts) wk − 1}. Since L 2 is an OA(w, (ts) k , m), we have |E| = (ts) k(w−u) . Take the j-th column c j of L 1 , and α = l
ej ∈ c j where e ∈ E. Let E = {e | l By the definition of friendship, we need only to show that |E ∩ E | = (ts) (k−1)(w−u) . In other words, we need only to show that there exist exactly (ts) (k−1)(w−u) e's such that l
(1) ej = α and l (2) ehg = β g for 1 ≤ g ≤ u. Suppose α = (x 1 , x 2 ), β g = (y 1g , y 2g ), 1 ≤ g ≤ u. Then we have the following two systems of equations:
where e = i + i × t wk . Since A 1 • B 1 is a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m), there exist exactly t (k−1)(w−u) such i from the first system of equations. Also, since A 2 • B 2 is a TWOOA(k, s w , n; w, s k , m), from the second system of equations, we know that there exist exactly s (k−1)(w−u) such i . Therefore, there exist exactly (ts) (k−1)(w−u) such e. This completes the proof.
2
Theorem 6.11 (Product construction). If there exist both a TWOOA(k, t w , n; w, t k , m) and a TWOOA(k, s w , n; w, s k , m), then there exists a TWOOA(k, (ts) w , n; w, (ts) k , m).
Proof. The conclusion comes from Lemmas 6.9, 6.10, and the definition of a TWOOA.
2 Applying Theorem 6.11 with Corollary 6.8, we can obtain more infinite classes of TWOOAs. We omit the details here since it is trivial and space-consuming.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have generalized the notion of a TWOOA due to Kurosawa and Obana [5, 9] , and then used the generalized TWOOAs to construct many infinite classes of unconditionally secure multi-receiver multi-message A-codes. Our unconditionally secure multi-receiver multi-message A-codes exceed Safavi-Naini and Wang's at least in the numbers of receivers and source states. For example, for an arbitrarily fixed prime q, in Safavi-Naini and Wang's A-code, the maximum numbers of receivers and source states are both q, while in our A-code, the maximum numbers of receivers and source states are m(k, q) and m(w, q), respectively, which are greater than q in many cases. We conjecture that most of the newly obtained infinite classes of unconditionally secure multi-receiver multi-message A-codes are optimum in the sense of the deception probabilities, the sizes of keys, and the numbers of receivers and source states. Keeping the numbers of receivers and source states in mind, we immediately know that Kurosawa and Obana's definition for optimality [9] is not adequate.
